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Book Reviews,
AN INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET LAW, by Harold
J. Berman. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1950. Pp.
x, 322. $4.75.

JUSTICE IN RUSSIA:

It is very difficult to gather accurate information about the
Soviet legal system and its practical operation. A study and
interpretation of Soviet statutes, governmental decrees, judicial
decisions, and legal textbooks would not suffice to convey an
adequate picture of Soviet law, for, as Mr. Berman points out in
his book, in Russia the gap between the law as written and the
law as practiced is very large. Only a direct observation of legal
administration and law enforcement would give us a true insight
into the character of the system, but the iron curtain not only
shuts us off from such immediate observation but also makes firsthand reports about the workings of Russian legal institutions
increasingly unreliable. Much of the material available on this
sphere of Soviet life is propagandistically colored either by
undiscriminating admiration or by unqualified detestation. Today
an attempt to weigh pros and cons in an objective search for
undistorted truth involves at times a certain risk to the author
of coming under suspicion, a risk not confined to writers of the
Soviet Union and her satellites.
As the author states in his introduction, much of the information compiled in his book was obtained through visits'to Russian
DP camps in Germany and France. There he talked to workers,
peasants, schoolteachers, engineers, economists, and lawyerssome of whom later came to the United States-about their
experiences under Soviet law. By this contact with people who
had lived under the system, he supplemented the theoretical
information he had derived from his study of the written sources.
Since a number of these people definitely were not propagandists
for the Soviets but, on the contrary, men eager to change their
loyalties, Mr. Berman probably obtained a more balanced view
of Soviet legal life by using this method than if he had talked to
Soviet lawyers or other citizens living under the shadow of the
secret police.
Whether or not the picture painted by Mr. Berman is in all
[159]

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XIII

respects a true portrait, nobody but a completely unbiased expert
on the entire Soviet system of law could attest to. There will be
people who will argue that any use of such words as "law" and
"justice" in relation to Soviet Russia is futile and misleading, and
that the only instrument of government in that country is power,
ruthlessly used or abused in the hands of a small governmental
clique uninhibited by any concern for law. If this were true,
life in the Soviet Union would be chaotic beyond description;
there would be no rules governing marriage, divorce, the making
of wills, the leasing of property, the adoption of children, the
performance of a sales contract, or the endorsement of a check.
Every decision concerning a transaction between individuals
would be an arbitrary and unpredictable ad hoc pronouncement
by an official invested with unbounded discretion. No observer
of present-day Russian reality has provided us with a description
in such terms. Mr. Berman is obviously correct when he informs
us that "a system of law and a system of force exist side by side
in the Soviet Union." There are many areas of life which are
governed by well-defined standards and in which the decision of
disputes is entrusted to specialized agencies following pre-defined
rules and procedures. This is true, for example, in the fields of
contractual liability, negotiable instruments, responsibility for
torts, sales, domestic relations, social insurance, and non-political
criminal law. There are other areas, characterized by the predominance of the political factor, where terror and force are the
most conspicuous tools of governmental policy. Thus, we are
confronted with the phenomenon of the "dual state," in which
a stabilized legal sector co-exists with a fluid sphere of unlimited
prerogative.
Mr. Berman deliberately confines his analysis to the legal
domain and omits a detailed description of the system of force in
effect in the Soviet state. The question to which he might perhaps
have given more elaborate consideration is the mutual relationship and interpenetration of the two "orders." He does point out
that the inherent conflict between law and force in Soviet
Russia results in some strange paradoxes and inconsistencies,
and that Soviet law is "always precarious" because any threat to
the political stability of the regime may cause the abandonment
of law in the area of danger. If this is true, the ever-present
imminence of terror must considerably taint and vitiate the
beneficial features of the legally stabilized sector. Undoubtedly
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a citizen of Russia possesses today, on the "legal" side of the fence,
certain personal rights, such as property in consumptive goods,
the right to make a will, to recover damages for injuries caused
by others, and the right to receive workmen's compensation and
old-age benefits. The courts will normally recognize and protect these rights. However, political conformity is a conditionin-fact of their enforcement and, as the numerous Soviet "purges"
have shown, even faithful compliance with a line suddenly abandoned by the Communist Party may be punishable as "heresy"
after the volte-face has been accomplished. Thus, the threats of
ostracism, administrative deportation to a labor camp, and execution hang like a Damocles sword over the "guaranteed" domain
of the law, and the enforcement of personal rights is contingent
on "political reliability" often determined by elusive tests. It is
hard to see how under these circumstances the areas of law and
political force can be kept strictly apart and "compartmentalized,"
as the Soviet leaders claim.
Mr. Berman distinguishes three main components of Soviet
law. The first is the socialist component, which is characterized
by an attempt to find legal solutions for problems created by the
nationalization of production and the collectivization of agriculture. The second is the Russian component, representing
inherited traditions and peculiar national traits which have
become embodied in Soviet law. The third component is termed
by Mr. Berman the "parental" factor. Mr. Berman finds a tendency in the Soviet system to regard the function of law, judicial
tribunals, and legal procedures as a primarily "educational" one.
The role of law is likened by the Soviet authorities to that of a
parent, guardian, or teacher whose, task it is to provide guidance
to persons needful of pedagogical care. Mr. Berman, in an
original and arresting way, traces the consequences of this
approach through various branches of Soviet law, such as procedural law, family law, criminal law, labor law, and pre-contract
disputes. Our own law has in the past treated the individual as
a self-reliant, mature, and completely responsible being able to
take care of his own interests without help from governmental
agencies, and our whole "adversary" system of procedure is based
on this psychology. However, as Llewellyn and others have
shown, the paternalistic element is not entirely absent under our
system, and it seems to attain a steadily increasing importance.
Mr. Berman's book is lucidly and attractively written and,
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by focusing the spotlight on truly fundamental problems, he is
able to keep the reader's attention alive from the beginning to
the end. To this reviewer, the picture he has drawn of the Soviet
legal system is in its chief contours convincing.
EdgarBodenheimer*
CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL ADMIN-

by Arthur T. Vanderbilt. Washington Square
Publishing Corp. New York City, 1952. Pp. 1390.
ISTRATION,

This is a book which every law student, practicing lawyer
and judge should have and refer to time and again.
To review this magnificent book one should first review
briefly the career of its author. Chief Justice Vanderbilt is a
man of many facets, of prodigious energy and ability. As is well
known, he was an outstanding practicing lawyer for thirty-four
years, and for much of that period was concurrently a professor
of law at New York University and for five years its dean. Since
1948 he has been Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, ably performing tremendous administrative duties while
at the same time maintaining a tradition of carrying more than
his full load of appellate cases. He nonetheless has found the
time to write many fine articles and carry a laboring oar in the
building of the New York University Law Center. In addition,
he has taken an active part in the advisory committee on the
Revision of Statutes, the Citizenship Clearing House, the newly
created Institute of Judicial Administration, and in the Judiciary
Section of the American Bar Association. In brief, he has amazed
even those who know and respect his tremendous ability and
energy.

This latest of his publications reflects his wealth of experience in his many sided career.
The student, lawyer and judge will gain a new perspective
from the author's discussion of the historical development of the
principles of pleading and of the conflicting theories and systems.
As a working tool, however, this book is especially valuable.
The various steps in court procedure, considered in order by
Chief Justice Vanderbilt, are:
1. In what court may suit be brought-jurisdiction.
2. Who may sue whom-parties.
Professor of Law, University of Utah.

